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Summary
Somewhat surprisingly, cross-country empirical evidence (at least in the cross section) does not seem to support the
predictions of standard models that economies with stricter regulations on hiring and ﬁring should have a lower
pace of job reallocation. One problem in exploring these issues empirically has been the difﬁculty of comparing
countries on the basis of harmonised measures of job reallocation. A related problem is that there may be
unobserved measurement or other factors accounting for differences in job reallocation across countries. This paper
overcomes these challenges by using harmonised measures of job creation and destruction in a sample of 16
developed and emerging economies (including four transition economies), exploiting the country, industry and ﬁrm
size dimensions. The analysis of variance in the paper shows that ﬁrm size effects are a dominant factor in
accounting for the variation in the pace of job reallocation across country, industry and size cells. However, even
after controlling for industry and size effects there remain signiﬁcant differences in job ﬂows across countries that
could reﬂect differences in labour market regulations. We use the harmonised data to explore this hypothesis with a
difference-in-difference approach. We ﬁnd strong and robust evidence that stringent hiring and ﬁring regulations
tend to reduce the pace of job reallocation.
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Over the past decade, a growing body of evidence has accumulated suggesting that the
reallocation of factors of production – including labour – plays a major role in driving
productivity growth (see, for example, Olley and Pakes (1996), Griliches and Regev (1995),
Foster et al. (2001), Foster et al. (2002) and Bartelsman et al. (2004)). New ﬁrms enter the
market and create new jobs, while other unproﬁtable ﬁrms exit the market contributing to job
destruction (see, for example, Sutton (1997), Pakes and Ericson (1998), Geroski (1995)).
Incumbent ﬁrms are in a continuous process of adaptation in response to the development of
new products and processes, the growth and decline in markets and changes in competitive
forces (Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)). Market structure and size composition of ﬁrms play a
major role in shaping the magnitude of job ﬂows and their characteristics (Davis et al. (1996)).
For example, smaller businesses are inherently more dynamic, in part because they tend to be
young ventures and adjust through a learning-by-doing process (Dunne et al. (1988), Dunne
et al. (1989)). In addition, some industries have inherently higher job ﬂows than others in all
countries, given the smaller size of their typical business and lower inherent entry costs (for
example, Foster et al. (2002) report that job ﬂows in the US retail sector are 1.5 times higher
than in the manufacturing sector).
Standard models (see, for example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)) predict that, in addition to
technology and market-driven factors, the institutional and regulatory environment in which
ﬁrms operate will have an impact on the pace of job ﬂows. Moreover, consistent with the
discussion above, such models imply that restrictions that dampen reallocation will in turn lower
productivity as the dampening of job reallocation reduces the extent to which an economy is
allocating activity to the most productive producers. However, the empirical evidence on labour
regulations and job ﬂows is inconclusive – countries with different types of labour regulations
are observed to have fairly similar gross job ﬂows (see, for example, Bartelsman et al. (2009),
Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Boeri (1999)).1
The lack of a strong empirical relationship between labour ﬂexibility regulations and gross job
ﬂows at the aggregate level may be due to various elements. Stringent labour regulations may be
associated with other regulatory and institutional factors that also affect job ﬂows. For example,
Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that the greater compression of wages in Europe than in the
US can compensate the differences in labour regulations and so explain the similarity of the job
turnover rates. A more fundamental problem is that cross-country analyses of job ﬂows may be
ﬂawed by severe omitted variable problems and measurement error, including differences in the
distribution of activity across industries and size of ﬁrms, as well as different business size
1There is some evidence that labour market regulations inﬂuence worker turnover (Bentolila and Bertola (1990),
Nickell and Layard (1999)) but the impact on worker turnover should also translate into patterns for job turnover
which are not observed. An alternative approach has been to look at speciﬁc policy experiments within countries.
Kugler (2007) summarises a number of empirical studies that have looked at the effects of reform episodes on job
ﬂows in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the US. These episodes provide “natural experiments” that allow
comparing groups of workers targeted by the reform to groups of workers not directly affected by the reform before
and after the policy change in what is otherwise the same macroeconomic and regulatory environment. The main
conclusion of these studies is that increasing the strictness of employment protection legislation reduces worker
ﬂows, while the composition of employment is also swayed against young and female workers.
1cut-off points in the enterprise surveys from which job ﬂows data are obtained. In this paper, we
overcome these obstacles by using detailed indicators of job ﬂows drawn from harmonised and
integrated ﬁrm-level databases covering 16 developed, emerging and transition economies of
central and eastern Europe. With these data, we explore in detail the industry and size
dimensions of job ﬂows, and relate them to institutional differences across countries.
To preview results, we ﬁnd that countries share a number of features of job ﬂows along the
industry and size dimensions. All countries are characterised by large job ﬂows compared with
net employment changes. These vary signiﬁcantly and systematically across industries, pointing
to technological and market-driven factors, but they vary especially across ﬁrms of different
size. To provide a perspective on the importance of ﬁrm size, we ﬁnd that industry effects alone
account for about 5 per cent of the variation in job reallocation rates across country, industry and
size classes, while ﬁrm size effects alone account for about 47 per cent of the same variation.
However, even after controlling for industry and size effects, there remain notable cross-country
differences in job ﬂows. In this paper, we develop a formal test of the role that hiring and ﬁring
regulations have in explaining these differences, and also test for the robustness of our results to
the inclusion of other regulations affecting business operations. We use a
difference-in-difference approach in which we identify an industry and size class’s baseline job
reallocation from the US data. The advantage, compared with standard cross-country (or even
cross-country/cross-industry) empirical studies, is that we exploit within-country differences
across industrysize groups based on the interaction between country and industrysize
characteristics. Thus, we can also control for country and industrysize effects, thereby
minimising the problems of omitted variable bias and other misspeciﬁcations. We ﬁnd support
for the general hypothesis that hiring and ﬁring costs reduce turnover, especially in those
industries and size classes that require more frequent labour adjustment. Moreover, stringent
labour regulations have a stronger effect on the labour reallocation that is originated by the entry
and exit of ﬁrms than that due to reallocation among incumbents.
Before proceeding, it is useful to discuss two recent papers that exploit job ﬂows across
industries within countries to investigate the role of employment protection: Micco and Pages
(2007) and Messina and Vallanti (2007). Messina and Vallanti (2007) focus on cyclical and
secular variation in job turnover.2 The paper that is closest to ours in terms of questions and
approach is Micco and Pages (2007). The latter paper exploits industry level gross job ﬂows
data for manufacturing for 18 countries and uses a difference-in-difference speciﬁcation close to
the speciﬁcation we consider in this paper. Our analysis differs from this study along a number
2Messina and Vallanti (2007)’s focus on cyclical and secular variation is different from our cross-sectional
focus but their paper is in many ways in the spirit of this paper by exploiting within country variation to identify the
role of employment protection. Their ﬁnding that countries with tighter employment protection exhibit less cyclical
volatility in job destruction is complementary to our ﬁnding that countries with tighter employment protection have
fewer differences in job reallocation across industry and size classes. The Amadeus dataset they use is less suitable
to explore cross sectional variation since it does not capture ﬁrm entry and exit well. Nor is the Amadeus dataset
well suited to exploit differences in job ﬂows across ﬁrm size. In our ﬁndings, both ﬁrm size and ﬁrm entry and exit
play critical roles in the variation in job ﬂows and in the role of employment protection in inﬂuencing that variation.
While both the Messina and Vallanti (2007) and the current paper ﬁnd a role for employment protection in
dampening job ﬂows on some dimension, an interesting open question is the productivity and welfare implications
across the different dimensions. For example, the model of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) has clear predictions
about the adverse productivity consequences of stiﬂing the pace of reallocation in the steady state but is silent on
the consequences of dampening reallocation over the cycle.
2of related key dimensions. First, our indicators are drawn from a harmonised ﬁrm-level database
that covers all ﬁrms with at least one employee for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors. Second, our indicators allow exploiting country, industry and ﬁrm size variation in the
data, while previous studies tend to concentrate on country and industry variation. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size is by far the most important factor accounting for variation in the job ﬂows
across country, industry and ﬁrm size classes. This suggests that exploiting data by ﬁrm size is
important to provide greater within-country variation in job ﬂows for our empirical identiﬁcation
strategy but also that distortions to job ﬂows across countries may very well interact with the
ﬂow and ﬁrm size relationship. Indeed, evidence from enterprise surveys suggests that
policy-induced distortions tend to affect ﬁrms of different size very differently.3 Lastly, our data
allow distinguishing between job ﬂows generated by the entry and exit of ﬁrms and those
generated by the reallocation of labour by incumbent ﬁrms. As shown in the paper, this sheds
additional light on labour reallocation and the role of regulations in labour and product markets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our harmonised
ﬁrm-level dataset and discusses the different concepts we have used to characterise labour
reallocation. Section 3 analyses the main features of job ﬂows, highlighting the role of ﬁrm
dynamics, industry and size compositions. Section 4 introduces the difference-in-difference
approach used in the econometric analysis and discusses the empirical results for the baseline
and policy-augmented speciﬁcations of the job ﬂow equations. It also describes a battery of
robustness tests. Lastly, section 5 presents concluding remarks.
3See , for example, World Bank (2004), Pages et al. (2009)
32 Data
Our analysis of job ﬂows is based on detailed indicators drawn from a harmonised ﬁrm-level
database that includes 16 industrial, emerging and transition economies (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Mexico, Portugal,
Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the US) and covers the 1990s (the time period covered varies
by country - see Table A.1).4 Beyond the country dimension, the job ﬂow indicators vary across
detailed industry and size classes and over time. They have been extracted from country
ﬁrm-level datasets with an active participation of local experts in each of the countries, and
involved the harmonisation of key concepts to the extent possible (such as entry and exit of
ﬁrms, job creation and destruction, and the unit of measurement), as well as the deﬁnition of
common methods to compute the indicators (see Bartelsman et al. (2009) for details).5
The key features of the micro data underlying the analysis are as follows:
Unit of observation: Data used tend to conform to the following deﬁnition: “an
organisational unit producing goods or services which beneﬁts from a certain
degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its current
resources” (EUROSTAT (1998)). Generally, this will be above the establishment
level.
Size threshold: While some registers include even single-person businesses (ﬁrms
without employees), others omit ﬁrms smaller than a certain size, usually in terms
of the number of employees (businesses without employees), but sometimes in
terms of other measures such as sales (as is the case in the data for France). Data
used in this study exclude single-person businesses. However, because smaller ﬁrms
tend to have more volatile ﬁrm dynamics, remaining differences in the threshold
across different country datasets should be taken into account in the international
comparison.
Industry coverage: Special efforts have been made to organise the data along a
common industry classiﬁcation (ISIC Rev.3) that matches the OECD-Structural
database (STAN). In the panel datasets constructed to generate the tabulations, ﬁrms
were allocated to the single STAN industry that most closely ﬁt their operations
over the complete time-span.
The ﬁrm-level and job ﬂows data come from business registers (Estonia, Finland, Latvia,
Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the US), social security databases (Germany, Italy, Mexico)
or corporate tax rolls (Argentina, France, Hungary). Annual industry surveys are generally not
the best source for ﬁrm demographics, due to sampling and reporting issues, but have been used
4The database also includes Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan (China) as well as Canada, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Romania and Venezuela, but annual data on job ﬂows are not available for these countries or are not
fully reliable.
5Micco and Pages (2007) compiled a dataset from different country sources covering 2-digit manufacturing
sector information for 18 countries. Their dataset does not include transition countries, and does not allow
differentiating job ﬂows by ﬁrm status and ﬁrm size for all the countries.
4nonetheless for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Data for Portugal are drawn from an
employment-based register containing information on both establishments and ﬁrms. All these
databases allow ﬁrms and jobs to be tracked over time because addition or removal of ﬁrms
from the registers reﬂects the actual entry and exit of ﬁrms.
We deﬁne four size classes based on the number of ﬁrm employees: 1- 19 workers, 20-49
workers, 50-99 workers, and 100 or more workers. The job reallocation rate (sum) is deﬁned as
the sum of job creation (pos) and job destruction (neg) rates,6 and we allow those to vary by the
type of ﬁrm: entering, exiting or continuing ﬁrms. Job creation rate is deﬁned as
possict =
åi2SC+ DEsict
0:5(Esict+Esic;t 1) and job destruction rate as negsict =
åi2SC  DEsict
0:5(Esict+Esic;t 1), where i represents
industry, s represents size class, c represents country, t represents time (year) and E denotes
employment. Capital letters S andC refer to a set of size classes or countries, respectively, SC+
denotes positive changes in employment and SC  negative changes in employment. The symbol
D denotes the ﬁrst-difference operator, DEt = Et  Et 1.7 The job ﬂows are calculated on a
yearly basis. In all our empirical analysis, we use time averages to reduce the possible impact of
business cycle ﬂuctuations in the years for which we have the data and the possibility that such
ﬂuctuations were not synchronised across countries and thus not captured by the use of common
time ﬁxed effects.
6We take averages of pos and neg, and then calculate sum.
7See also Davis et al. (1996).
53 Basic facts about job turnover in industrial and emerging
economies of Latin America and central and eastern
Europe
In this section, we highlight the key stylised facts emerging from our analysis of job ﬂows
across countries, industries and ﬁrm size.8 These stylised facts are used in the following sections
to guide our multivariate analysis.9
1. Large job turnover in all countries
The ﬁrst stylised fact emerging from the data is the large magnitude of gross job ﬂows (the sum
of job creation and job destruction) in all countries compared with net employment changes,
both at the level of total economy and in manufacturing (see Table B.1 in the appendix and
Haltiwanger et al. (2006)). Gross job ﬂows range from about 25 per cent of total employment on
average in the OECD countries, to about 30 per cent in Latin America and the transition
economies. By contrast, net employment changes tend to be very modest if not nil in the OECD
and Latin America over the sample period, while the transition economies recorded a signiﬁcant
net job growth in the period covered by the data, after the substantial job losses of the early
phases of the transition.
Taken at face value, the observed high pace of job reallocation in all countries may suggest a
high degree of dynamism in virtually all economies. However, even at the aggregate level there
are signiﬁcant cross-country differences and, in addition, many different country-speciﬁc factors
tend to inﬂuence the pace of job reallocation, within each country, across industries and size
classes. Accordingly, the identiﬁcation of the impact of regulations requires exploiting more
than simply cross-country variation.
2. Firm turnover plays a major role in total job ﬂows
The second stylised fact is the strong contribution of ﬁrm creation and destruction to job ﬂows.
Entering and exiting ﬁrms account for about 30-40 per cent of total job ﬂows (see Table B.1 in
the appendix). In the transition countries, entry was even more important in the early years of
transition to a market economy, while the exit of obsolete ﬁrms became more predominant in
the second half of the 1990s, both for the total economy and in manufacturing, when market
contestability strengthened.10
3. Small ﬁrms contribute disproportionately to job ﬂows
Small ﬁrms account disproportionately for job ﬂows and ﬁrm turnover in all countries of our
sample. Figure 1 presents job reallocation rates by ﬁrm size classes and countries. In general,
job reallocation is highest in ﬁrms with less than 20 employees, and the lowest in ﬁrms with
100+ employees. In the US, job turnover declines monotonically with ﬁrm size, and the decline
8See Geroski (1995) for a summary of the basic facts characterising ﬁrm demographics.
9A slightly longer list of the basic facts as well as their more detailed description can be found in Haltiwanger
et al. (2006).
10The large job ﬂows in the transition countries are not surprising. The process of transition started in the early
1990s and it included downsizing or exit of existing ﬁrms as well as the entry of many new ﬁrms as the economies
progressed toward a market economy.
6is particularly marked among large units (100+). Latin American countries follow similar
patterns to those of the US, while the European countries, with the exception of France, have a
less marked drop of job reallocation among larger units. The transition countries, on the other
hand, show a steeper slope in smaller size classes, especially in the early years of transition.11 It
is this variation of job ﬂows by size class as well as the variation across industries and countries
that we exploit in our empirical analysis.
The analysis of size-speciﬁc job reallocation rates should be complemented with a
decomposition of the overall job reallocation into that due to ﬁrms of different sizes. We ﬁnd
small ﬁrms account for the largest share of ﬁrm turnover and also for a signiﬁcant, albeit less
dominant, share of total job ﬂows. In terms of shares of job reallocation by size class, we ﬁnd a
U-shaped relationship that reﬂects two offsetting effects – ﬁrst, job ﬂows are higher for small
ﬁrms as evidenced in Figure 1 and second, employment is concentrated in larger ﬁrms.
Figure 1: Job reallocation across ﬁrms of different sizes, total economy
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database; see main text for details.
11Our data also suggest similar patterns for ﬁrm turnover by size class and country (results not presented here).
74. Analysis of variance
The next step is to assess the relative importance of the different dimensions – country, industry
and size – in explaining the overall variance in job ﬂows. Table 1 presents the analysis of
variance of job ﬂows, for the unbalanced total economy and manufacturing samples.12 We
consider different indicators of job ﬂows - gross job reallocation, job reallocation from entry and
exit and job reallocation for continuers. We also assess the contribution to the total variance of
industry, size, country and industrysize effects separately and, in addition, differentiate the
analysis of variance by region (OECD, transition economies and Latin America).13
It is noticeable that technological and market structure characteristics that are reﬂected in the
industry-speciﬁc effects explain only 5.1 per cent of the overall variation in gross job
reallocation across industry, size and country classes, although they account for a higher share in
Latin America (18.4 percent). They explain much less of the overall variation in the
manufacturing sample. By contrast, differences in the size structure of ﬁrms explain as much as
47.0 per cent of the total variation in cross-country gross job reallocation overall, and even more
in the manufacturing sample only (51.8 percent). Even country effects explain more of the
variation in gross job reallocation than the industry effects (except in Latin America for the total
economy sample). Hence, even though there are similarities among countries within a region,
there is still signiﬁcant variation across them. Overall, the combined industrysize effects
explain the bulk of the variation in gross job reallocation: 52.2 per cent overall, 46.9 per cent in
OECD countries, 64.3 per cent in Latin American countries and 55.8 per cent in transition
countries in the second half of the 1990s.
Size heterogeneity plays a particularly strong role in explaining the variation of job creation by
new ﬁrms and job destruction by exiting ﬁrms. Size heterogeneity is particularly important in
Latin America, where it accounts for 70.2 per cent of the heterogeneity in job reallocation from
entry and exit. In the OECD countries, size heterogeneity plays a smaller role in both job
reallocation from entering and exiting ﬁrms.14 It is also interesting that size and industrysize
effects account for a substantially larger fraction of entry and exit variation than for continuers.
Apparently, a key component that accounts for variation in job reallocation across industrysize
and size classes is differences in the pace of entry and exit. Put differently, this result suggests
that ﬁrm entry and exit is a key margin in driving job ﬂows and, as such, our working hypothesis
is that it may be this variation that is especially sensitive to distortions.
12The total economy sample is unbalanced in the sense that it covers manufacturing only for Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and the United Kingdom - see Table A.1 for details.
13Mexico became a member of the OECD in 1994 and Hungary became a member in 1996, but for the purposes
of this paper, they are classiﬁed as a Latin American economy and a transition economy, respectively.
14In unreported results, we have examined the analysis of variance separately for entry and exit. The most
interesting aspect of this latter exercise is the ﬁnding that in the transition economies there is a strong difference
between the factors accounting for variation in job creation and destruction. The variation of job creation by
entrants is strongly inﬂuenced by size heterogeneity, while the importance of size effects for variation in job
destruction by exiters is relatively small. The reason for the latter is that there are offsetting forces inﬂuencing exit
in the transition economies. As in most countries, many young businesses fail in the early phases of their life, but in
the transition economies (particularly in the early phases of their economic transformation) structural changes also
involved the exit of many large, state-owned enterprises.
8Table 1: Analysis of variance, total economy (unbalanced panel) and manufacturing
Total economy Manufacturing
Gross job Job reallocation Job reallocation Gross job Job reallocation Job reallocation
reallocation - entry and exit - continuers reallocation - entry and exit - continuers
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
All 0.0511 0.0074 0.0924 0.0057 0.0069 0.0167
OECD 0.0730 -0.0386 0.1660 -0.0014 -0.0067 0.0388
LAC 0.1836 0.0580 0.2585 -0.0113 -0.0166 -0.0102
Transition -0.0274 -0.0386 -0.0008 -0.0348 -0.0351 -0.0192
SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.4690 0.5008 0.1924 0.5177 0.5094 0.2444
OECD 0.4100 0.4226 0.1750 0.5209 0.3968 0.3473
LAC 0.4724 0.7023 0.1169 0.5897 0.7764 0.1507
Transition 0.5220 0.4557 0.2966 0.5045 0.4055 0.2901
COUNTRY EFFECTS
All 0.1527 0.1342 0.2172 0.1672 0.1548 0.2435
OECD 0.1910 0.2115 0.2015 0.1829 0.2794 0.1569
LAC 0.1474 0.0382 0.3640 0.2030 0.0613 0.5073
Transition 0.0758 0.1020 0.1232 0.0625 0.0950 0.1044
INDUSTRYSIZE EFFECTS
All 0.5215 0.5069 0.2805 0.5331 0.5200 0.2626
OECD 0.4688 0.3762 0.3157 0.5167 0.3522 0.3845
LAC 0.6430 0.7958 0.2737 0.5631 0.7833 0.0307
Transition 0.5584 0.4236 0.3328 0.5495 0.3849 0.3188
Adjusted R-squared is reported. Late 1990s data are used for transition countries.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
9Table 2: Rank correlations with the US job ﬂows, total economy (unbalanced panel) and manufacturing
Total economy Manufacturing
Gross job Job reallocation Job reallocation Gross job Job reallocation Job reallocation
reallocation - entry and exit - continuers reallocation - entry and exit - continuers
OECD 0.7515 0.7223 0.6254 0.7220 0.7189 0.6620
Germany 0.8468 0.9191 0.7214 0.9098 0.9153 0.9234
Finland 0.6946 0.3532 0.7742 0.6714 0.4301 0.7530
France 0.5418 0.7385 0.1762 0.6562 0.7732 0.2892
United Kingdom 0.8994 0.8229 0.6565 0.8994 0.8229 0.6565
Italy 0.6901 0.6896 0.6628 0.6366 0.5772 0.6932
Portugal 0.8363 0.8106 0.7611 0.8015 0.7948 0.6565
LAC 0.8528 0.8542 0.5622 0.8606 0.8705 0.5608
Argentina 0.8844 0.8421 0.7316 0.8847 0.8486 0.6677
Brazil 0.8987 0.9095 0.8135 0.8987 0.9095 0.8135
Chile 0.6787 0.7543 -0.1212 0.6787 0.7543 -0.1212
Colombia 0.9170 0.8975 0.6062 0.9170 0.8975 0.6062
Mexico 0.8853 0.8676 0.7807 0.9237 0.9425 0.8379
TRANSITION 0.7556 0.6905 0.5903 0.7767 0.6832 0.6599
Estonia 0.7364 0.6236 0.6338 0.7460 0.5866 0.7145
Hungary 0.8321 0.8560 0.6897 0.8996 0.8985 0.8064
Latvia 0.7005 0.7215 0.4204 0.6638 0.7000 0.4053
Slovenia 0.7534 0.5609 0.6171 0.7972 0.5477 0.7133
Late 1990s data are used for transition countries.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
1
0Table 3: Job ﬂows - US versus other countries
Total economy Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
USA SUM 0.6699*** 0.6121***
[0.0396] [0.0372]
USA SUMEU 0.5726*** 0.4849***
[0.0521] [0.0353]
USA SUMTransition 0.7795*** 0.7467***
[0.0676] [0.0581]
USA SUMLAC 0.8542*** 0.7987***
[0.0514] [0.0461]
USA SUM<20 workers 0.5711*** 0.4744***
[0.0430] [0.0601]
USA SUM20-49 workers 0.4360*** 0.3048***
[0.0573] [0.0688]
USA SUM50-99 workers 0.3890*** 0.2201***
[0.0676] [0.0769]
USA SUM100+ workers 0.2918*** 0.0207
[0.1019] [0.1435]
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 940 940 940 709 709 709
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.85
All regressions are weighted by the total employment in each country, industry and size cell and include an
intercept. Robust standard errors in brackets. = signiﬁcant at 10%, = signiﬁcant at 5%, = signiﬁcant
at 1%. USA SUM: industrysize job reallocation in the US. EU denotes the OECD European countries.
TransitiondenotesthecountriesincentralandeasternEurope. LACdenotesthecountriesinLatinAmerica.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
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15. The correlation of industrysize job ﬂows across countries
It is also of importance to assess the correlation of industry job ﬂows across countries. If
market-driven and technological factors were the only factor at play, we should observe a strong
correlation across countries. However, industry-level job ﬂows in each country are also
inﬂuenced by the institutional environment in which ﬁrms operate. Lack of correlation may
accordingly be associated with policies and institutions that distort job ﬂows. Job ﬂows are
part-and-parcel of the creative destruction process, and an unfavourable institutional
environment will cause this process to be distorted (Caballero and Hammour (2000)). For this
descriptive evidence, we use the rank correlation as it is more robust to measurement error but
the ﬁndings are robust to using Pearson correlation statistics.
Industrysize-level correlations with the US are particularly strong for most Latin American
countries in the sample, despite the very different degree of economic development, as well as
for United Kingdom (Table 2). In general, correlations are on average slightly higher if we focus
only on manufacturing. Some of the lowest correlations are found for some EU countries, in
particular France (0.54). It is also interesting to see that transition economies had a much
stronger correlation of their job ﬂow patterns by industry and size class with the US in the
sample that covers the entire 1990s than in the sample used in this paper that focuses on the
1996-2001 period (see Haltiwanger et al. (2006)). This might seem surprising, since the early
phases of the transition were characterised by massive job reallocation and the unique need to
change the structure of the economy. One working hypothesis that we develop later in the paper
is that after the initial phases of transition, these countries have moved toward the job ﬂow
patterns observed in EU countries, with whom they share several policy and institutional factors.
6. The US versus other countries in the “slope” of the industrysize reallocation
relationship
The ﬁndings from the previous two subsections suggest that industrysize effects account for a
large fraction of the variation in job ﬂows across industry, size and country classes, and also
strong correlations between the rank order of job ﬂows by industry and size in any given country
with that in the US. These ﬁndings help motivate our empirical analysis of regulations below
since they clearly indicate that there are common factors underlining the patterns of job ﬂows
across countries and across industry and size classes. As discussed above, these patterns
plausibly reﬂect technology, demand and cost fundamentals (including the distribution of
idiosyncratic shocks and the costs of reallocation) that vary across industry and size classes.
Before going to a more formal empirical analysis of the effects of policy-induced distortions on
job ﬂows, we run a simple descriptive regression in which we quantify how the “slope” of the
industrysize relationship varies between the US and the rest of the world. We take the US as
our benchmark because it is the country with arguably relatively low policy-induced distortions.






where Dc are country c (c = 1;:::;C) dummies,USJFlowsi is the US job ﬂow variable in size
class s and industry i, and e is the iid error term. We estimate weighted regressions, using total
employment in each country, size and industry cell as weights in order to take into account the
12differences in the employment that each cell represents. This speciﬁcation enables us to quantify
the relationship, or slope, between cross-industrysize differences in gross job ﬂows between
the US and other countries in our sample. In this descriptive analysis, we start with a baseline
speciﬁcation in which we only include the US job ﬂow benchmark and the country dummies
(equation (1)). We then allow the coefﬁcient of the US job ﬂow variable to vary by region and
by ﬁrm size class.15
As expected, the estimated coefﬁcient on the US job ﬂow in column (1) in Table 3 is positive
and highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the bivariate correlation analysis discussed above. However,
the estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly less than one, suggesting that, other things being equal,
the responsiveness to market and technologically-driven factors that affect reallocation in the US
is less than one in the other countries. Indeed, if we take the US job ﬂow rate as the benchmark
for the propensity for the industrysize class to reallocate labour as a result to technology and
market fundamentals, this ﬁnding suggests that an increase in the propensity that leads to a 10
percentage points increase in job reallocation from one industrysize class to another in the US,
only leads to an increase of 6.7 percentage points from the same industrysize class to the other
in other countries in the sample. In a suggestive sense, the coefﬁcient being less than one is
consistent with the view that the sample of EU, Latin America and transition economies have
factors that distort the reallocation process.16
If we then allow the coefﬁcient on US job ﬂows to vary by region (EU, transition countries and
Latin America) (column (2)), we notice that there is a closer link between cross-industrysize
differences in gross job ﬂows between the US and the Latin American countries than between
the US and the European Union countries.
However, the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly less than one in all regions. Moreover, the coefﬁcients
on US job ﬂow for the EU countries and for transition countries are not signiﬁcantly different
from each other at 1 per cent signiﬁcance level (but they are different at 5 per cent signiﬁcance
level). The Wald test for the equality of the coefﬁcients on US job ﬂow for transition countries
and for Latin American countries cannot be rejected at any of the usual signiﬁcance levels.
Next, we allow the coefﬁcient on US job ﬂows to vary by ﬁrm size (column (3)) and we ﬁnd -
perhaps not surprisingly - that the coefﬁcient is the highest for the smallest size class (1-19
employees) and declines monotonically for the larger size classes. In other words, the patterns
of cross industry job ﬂows in the US and other countries are more similar among small ﬁrms
than among larger ﬁrms, possibly because small ﬁrms are exempt from certain regulations
and/or can more easily avoid other regulations. Hence, small ﬁrms show a degree of dynamism
that is closer to that of the non-distorted (US) economy. For larger ﬁrms, regulations are likely
to be more binding, especially in those industries that are inherently more volatile. The equality
of all pairs with the coefﬁcent for the smallest size class can be rejected at 1 per cent
signiﬁcance level, indicating that the coefﬁcient for the smallest size class is highly signiﬁcantly
15The measure of job ﬂows is the sum of job creation and job destruction rates (sum) and all variables are time
averages over the available annual observations (see the next section for more details).
16Appropriate caution needs to be used in interpreting the magnitude of the coefﬁcient since measurement errors
can drive the coefﬁcient below one. However, it is noticeable that this coefﬁcient is always less than one, and that
the pattern of variation in the magnitude of this coefﬁcient across regions and size classes is consistent with our
interpretation.
13different from those of larger size classes. The equality of the coefﬁcients cannot be rejected for
the coefﬁcients for the 20-49 and 50-99 size class pair at any of the usual signiﬁcance levels,
while the equality of the coefﬁcient for the 20-49 and 100+ size class pair and for the 50-99 and
100+ size class pair can be rejected at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.
144 Empirical analysis
4.1 The framework
In this section, we develop an empirical analysis of the determinants of the observed differences
in job ﬂows across countries, industries and size classes. We base our empirical analysis on
three important results discussed in the previous section: (i) a signiﬁcant share of the total
variance in job ﬂows observed in the data is explained by industrysize effects, (ii) there is a
high correlation of industrysize job ﬂows across countries, and (iii) the other countries in the
sample tend to have less variation across industrysize classes in the magnitude of reallocation
than the US The ﬁrst two results are consistent with the hypothesis that the distribution of
idiosyncratic proﬁt shocks affecting desired employment and the costs that inﬂuence the
adjustment to such shocks vary systematically by industry and size class. For example, demand
characteristics in some industries imply that ﬁrms in these industries face higher volatility in
their product demand than other industries.17 Likewise, technological characteristics may
require more frequent re-tooling of the production process with the associated need to adjust the
workforce. Alternatively, certain technological characteristics may require ﬁrms to use highly
specialised workers and thus make them less likely to frequently adjust their workforce to
respond to idiosyncratic shocks. Demand and technological characteristics also affect the
composition of ﬁrms within each industry and their response to shocks. For example, some
industries are characterised by the presence of small ﬁrms, which tend to be more volatile than
large businesses in all countries.18
As discussed in the previous section, the third result suggests that there are factors that reduce
reallocation differences across industrysize classes in other countries relative to the US. Our
empirical analysis is designed to identify and quantify such factors. Before proceeding to that
empirical analysis, it is instructive to review the insights from the recent literature on adjustment
costs and reallocation (see, for example, Caballero et al. (1997)).
Adjustment costs governing responses to idiosyncratic shocks vary not only by industry and
size, due to underlying market and technological factors, but also across countries, due to
differences in institutions and policy settings. To the extent that institutions vary more by
country than industry and size, our working hypothesis is that the impact of institutions that
hinder adjustment in any given country will be more binding on industrysize cells with the
greatest propensity for reallocation in that country. The amount of job reallocation in a
particular sector hence depends on the distribution of productivity shocks and adjustment costs.
While these considerations tend to apply to incumbent ﬁrms, it is straightforward to extend the
17This microeconomic evidence is also consistent with an extensive literature that has highlighted the importance
of sector-speciﬁc shocks to aggregate ﬂuctuations, for example, Long and Plosser (1987), Horvath (1998).
18Different factors contribute to a different volatility of employment across ﬁrms of different size. On the one
hand, ﬁxed adjustment costs that are unrelated to ﬁrm size may make the area of inaction larger for small ﬁrms
compared with larger ones (see, for example, Nilsen et al. (2007)). On the other hand, distortions, such as for
example credit market imperfections, may force small ﬁrms to react more swiftly to shocks (see, for example,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)).
15argument to include the entry and exit of ﬁrms. Indeed, standard models of entry and exit (for
example, Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Melitz (2003), Asplund and
Nocke (2006)) posit that new entrant ﬁrms do not know, ex ante, their productivity type and
must pay an entry fee before learning their type. Firms enter the market until the expected
present discounted value of proﬁts from entry is just equal to the entry cost. Firms with low
productivity draw exit ex post. Higher adjustment costs – including labour adjustment costs –
reduce the present discounted value of ex ante proﬁts, especially for sectors with a high variance
of productivity shocks (for the reasons discussed above). This yields a lower pace of entry as
well as an implied lower pace of exit in the steady state. The theoretical model that illustrates
this effect most directly is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) who show that policy-induced
higher employment adjustment costs lead to a lower pace of job and ﬁrm turnover.
4.2 The estimation model
We explore the links between the regulatory environment in which ﬁrms operate and job
turnover by exploiting the observed industrysize variations through a difference-in-difference
approach (see Rajan and Zingales (1998)).19 The test is constructed as follows: we identify an
industrysize propensity for job reallocation from the US data. Under the assumption that
regulations in the labour and goods markets in the US are among the least restrictive in our
sample, variation in job reallocation across industrysize cells in the US should proxy for the
technological and market-driven differences in job reallocation in the absence of policy-induced
adjustment costs. Under the additional assumption that these technological and market-driven
differences in the demand for job reallocation carry over to other countries, we assess whether
industrysize cells that have a greater propensity for job reallocation are disproportionally
affected by regulations that raise adjustment costs. This would imply that, ceteris paribus,
industrysize cells with more volatile idiosyncratic proﬁt shocks and more frequent adjustment
of factors should be more strongly affected by regulations raising adjustment costs than those
industrysize cells with less volatile idiosyncratic proﬁt shocks and less frequent adjustment.
The advantage of our approach compared with standard cross-country/cross-industry empirical
studies is that we exploit within-country differences between industrysize cells based on the
interaction between country and industrysize characteristics. Thus, we can also control for
country and industrysize effects, thereby minimising problems of omitted variable bias and
other misspeciﬁcations.










where Dsi are industrysize si (si = 1;:::;IS) dummies, Dc are country c (c = 1;:::;C)
dummies,USJFlowsi is the US job ﬂow variable in size class s and industry i, Rc is the variable
19The difference-in-difference approach has already been used in the corporate literature (, for example,
Classens and Laeven (2003)), in the analysis of ﬁrm dynamics (Klapper et al. (2006)) and in the analysis of output
and employment growth as well as job ﬂows (Micco and Pages (2007)).
16measuring regulations in country c, and e is the iid error term. Controlling for country effects
sweeps out any country-speciﬁc variation, controlling for industrysize effects sweeps out the
large common factors associated with industry and size, and the key interaction term between
the US ﬂow in the industrysize class and the country regulation allows us to identify how the
measured regulatory environment affects the variation across industrysize classes within
countries. The US ﬂow here is used to quantify the propensity for the industrysize class to
reallocate and, as discussed, reﬂects the fundamental driving forces underlying job reallocation
across industrysize classes.
In what follows, the measure of job ﬂows used in the empirical analysis is the sum of job
creation and job destruction rates (sum).20 As stressed above, all our variables are time averages
over the available annual observations to reduce the possible impact of non-synchronised
business cycle ﬂuctuations in the years covered in our analysis. The sample is unbalanced and
covers fewer years for some countries than others (see Table A.1). We use the period from 1989
to 2001 for OECD and Latin American countries and sample from 1996 to 2001 for the
transition economies. The choice of the restricted subsample for the transition economies is
motivated by two interrelated factors. First and as discussed in the previous section, the initial
years of the transition process (1991 to 1995) were characterised by unprecedented reallocation
of labour – and other factors of production – across industries, ﬁrms and locations. The
magnitude and direction of the observed ﬂows were only temporary and, indeed, job ﬂows
declined towards the standards of the OECD countries over time, and also became more
balanced within each industrysize cell.21 Second, the early years of transition were
characterised by major regulatory reforms to conform countries’ institutional settings to those of
market economies. For these two reasons, focusing on the second half of the 1990s for the
transition economies is more appropriate in our comparative analysis of job ﬂows.22
In addition to the core speciﬁcation, we consider some closely related speciﬁcations. As a
robustness check, we estimate an augmented model that also considers business sector
regulations. In addition, we explore speciﬁcations that focus on, alternatively, job ﬂows from
entry and exit or continuing ﬁrms.
4.3 Regulations in labour and product markets
In the empirical analysis, we consider synthetic indicators of the stringency of regulations in the
labour and product markets, as well as the degree of enforcement of laws and regulations. Our
primary source for these is the “Economic Freedom of the World (EFW)” database (see
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)). This database has been developed under the auspices of the
Fraser Institute in Canada with the aid of a worldwide network of economists and research
20The results are largely unaffected by the use of excess job reallocation, that is, the difference between the sum
and the (absolute value of) net employment change. These results are available in the web appendix at
www.helenasch.net.
21Results for the whole sample for transition economies are available in the Web appendix at
www.helenasch.net.
22In any event, in the sensitivity analysis in section 4.5, we exclude each country in turn to assess the robustness
of our empirical results to the country sample composition.
17institutes. In particular, we use indicators referring to hiring and ﬁring regulations, regulation of
business activities and integrity of the legal system.
Other indicators of the stringency of labour regulations in developing and emerging economies
are available in the literature (, for example, the World Bank Doing Business database), but they
generally refer to the most recent past and may thus not properly capture the regulatory
environment over the period covered by our data (the 1990s). By contrast, the EFW tracks
changes in regulations over time and is thus more suitable for our analysis of job ﬂows that have
indeed been inﬂuenced by policy changes over the period covered by our data (see Table C.1 for
more detailed deﬁnitions of the variables used in our analysis and Table C.2 for their summary
statistics).
The EFW indicator of hiring and ﬁring regulations is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10
being the worst (most restrictive). The average of this indicator is the highest in transition
countries (5.70), followed by the OECD sample (5.43) and Latin America (4.68). This synthetic
indicator passes simple validation tests. For example, its correlation with a similar indicator of
employment protection legislation developed by the OECD is 0.85, statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 per cent level.23
In the sensitivity analysis, we also consider an EFW synthetic indicator of regulations in the
product market. Regulations affecting markets for goods and services have a strong impact on
the degree of competition and the pace and effectiveness of reallocation of resources, including
labour. Thus, more restrictive regulations that stiﬂe product market competition are also likely
to inﬂuence job ﬂows. The business regulation indicator is a simple average of ﬁve different
indicators24 that are designed to identify the extent to which regulatory restraints and
bureaucratic procedures limit competition and the operation of goods and services markets.
Business regulation is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most restrictive. This
indicator is on average the highest in Latin America (4.21), followed by transition countries
(3.32) and OECD countries (3.07).
Previous research (see, for example, Caballero et al. (2004), Heckman and Pages (2004))
suggests that the degree of enforcement of labour regulations – as well as other regulations – can
signiﬁcantly affect their impact on the economy. Available indicators suggest a signiﬁcant
variation in the rules of law and the degree of enforcement of laws and regulations in our sample
of OECD, Latin American and transition economies. Not only are some ﬁrms and jobs not
registered in Latin America and increasingly in the transition economies and some southern
European countries, registered ﬁrms may also not fully comply with the existing rules and
regulations. As an indication of the different degree of enforcement of laws and regulations, we
23We check the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure of employment protection legislation,
the OECD EPL index. Since this measure is not available for Latin America and transition countries in the early
1990s, we augmented it in two ways. First, for transition countries we used data on EPL collected by Haltiwanger
et al. (2003). Second, for Latin America we imputed EPL by regressing a measure of hiring and ﬁring regulations
from the Fraser Institute on EPL for transition and OECD countries and then using the estimated coefﬁcient to
calculate EPL. EPL is measured on a scale from 0 to 4, with 4 being the worst (most restrictive). It is on average the
strictest in OECD (2.35) and the least strict in Latin America (1.73).
24The detailed indicators used to construct the synthetic indicator are: price controls, administrative conditions
and new business, time with government bureaucracy, starting a new business, and irregular payments.
18consider the law and order indicator from the Fraser Institute (based on the Political Risk
Component I (Law and Order) from the International Country Risk Guide, ranging from 0 to 10,
10 being the worst).25 The indicator shows the highest compliance with laws and regulations in
the OECD sample of countries (average of 0.47), followed by the transition economies (average
of 1.76), and by the Latin American countries (average of 4.95).
To control for possibly differing degrees of enforcement of laws and regulations we adjust our








4.4 Regulations and job ﬂows
Table 4: Job ﬂows and the role of labour regulations (difference-in-difference analysis)
(1) (2)
USA SUMEPL (Adj) -0.1052***
[0.0149]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)EU -0.0890***
[0.0128]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)Transition -0.0689***
[0.0206]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)LAC -0.0561***
[0.0237]
Country effects YES YES
Industrysize effects YES YES
Observations 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.87 0.87
All regressions are weighted by the total employment in each coun-
try, industry and size cell and include an intercept. Robust standard
errors in brackets. = signiﬁcant at 10%, = signiﬁcant at 5%, =
signiﬁcant at 1%. USA SUM: industrysize job reallocation in the
US. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes
the countries in central and eastern Europe. LAC denotes the coun-
tries in Latin America. EPL (Adj) is an indicator of stringency of
hiring and ﬁring regulations adjusted to take into account different
degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
25Micco and Pages (2007) also make an attempt at controlling for different degrees of enforcement of
regulations by using an indicator of rules of laws and government effectiveness (see Kaufmann et al. (2004)). We
used the Fraser index of law and order because it is available for the time period for which our job ﬂows data are
available for the different countries.
26There is no indication in Gwartney and Lawson (2004) that the original regulatory variables consider the




USA SUMEPL (Adj) -0.1067***
[0.0222]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)EU -0.0774***
[0.0239]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)Transition -0.1463***
[0.0328]
USA SUMEPL (Adj)LAC -0.1644***
[0.0622]
USA SUMBus. Reg. (Adj) 0.0399
[0.0323]
USA SUMBus. Reg. (Adj)EU 0.0201
[0.0385]
USA SUMBus. Reg. (Adj)Transition 0.0301
[0.0725]
USA SUMBus. Reg. (Adj)LAC 0.2918**
[0.1153]
Country effects YES YES
Industrysize effects YES YES
Observations 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.87 0.87
All regressions are weighted by the total employment in each country,
industry and size cell and include an intercept. Robust standard errors in
brackets. = signiﬁcant at 10%, = signiﬁcant at 5%, = signiﬁcant at
1%. USA SUM: industrysize job reallocation in the US. EU denotes
the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in cen-
tral and eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America.
EPL (Adj) is an indicator of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations
adjusted to take into account different degrees of enforcement of regu-
lations. Bus. Reg. (Adj) is an indicator of stringency of business regu-
lations adjusted to take into account different degrees of enforcement of
regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical results of our policy-augmented job ﬂow regressions. We
use a difference-in-difference analysis by focusing on the variation of job ﬂows across
industrysize classes within each country. The estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction between
the US job ﬂow and the adjusted labour regulation (Table 4) is strongly signiﬁcant overall, and
in each of the subregions when we allow the coefﬁcient of the interaction to vary. Intrinsically
more volatile industries and size classes present lower levels of gross job turnover relative to the
less volatile industries and size classes in countries with more stringent hiring and ﬁring
regulations.
20How sizeable is the estimated impact of labour regulation on job ﬂows? Using the coefﬁcient on
the interaction term in column (1) of Table 4, we estimate that the difference in the job
reallocation in the industrysize cells with a high ﬂexibility requirement (90th percentile of the
ﬂexibility distribution in the US, corresponding to a gross job turnover of 40.2 per cent) and
industrysize cells with a low ﬂexibility requirement (10th percentile of the same distribution,
corresponding to a gross job turnover of 13.2 per cent) will be cut by about one half (14.3
percentage points) in a country at the 90th percentile of the index of hiring and ﬁring regulations
compared with a country at the 10th percentile of the hiring and ﬁring regulations.27
There are a number of reasons why it is important to assess the robustness of our results on
labour regulations to the inclusion of regulations in product markets. First, the exclusion of
product market regulations may lead to an omitted variable bias insofar as regulations in
different markets tend to be highly correlated, that is, countries that impose strict rules of hiring
and ﬁring also tend to impose more restrictive regulations on the goods and services markets.28
There are also speciﬁc aspects of product market regulations that can inﬂuence job ﬂows over
and above labour regulations. For example, since a signiﬁcant fraction of overall job ﬂows is
due to the entry and exit of ﬁrms, regulations affecting the start-up of a new business, as well as
bankruptcy rules that affect the exit of low performing units, may affect job ﬂows directly and
the way incumbents react to strict labour regulations. Koeniger and Prat (2007), for example,
argue that product and labour market regulations are complementary: by isolating incumbents
from the competition of potential entrants, barriers to entry allow incumbents to bear the ﬁring
costs more easily. Likewise, regulations affecting price-setting by ﬁrms and their relations with
the public administration and their clients can all inﬂuence incentives for ﬁrms to expand, adopt
new technologies and adjust their workforce.
To assess the robustness of our empirical results we thus augment our job ﬂows speciﬁcation by
adding a synthetic indicator of the stringency of business sector regulations. As for labour
regulations, we adjust this variable for the degree of enforcement (Table 5) and interact it with
the US gross job reallocation.29 The estimated effects of labour regulations on job ﬂows remain
strongly signiﬁcant overall and in the different regions. By contrast, the estimated coefﬁcient of
business regulations is estimated with a large standard error overall. When we differentiate the
coefﬁcient by region, we ﬁnd that the estimated effect of business regulations is even positive
27The estimated value is obtained as follows:
b[(USJFlow90th  USJFlow10th)(HF90th  HF10th)]
where b is the estimated coefﬁcient,USJFlow and HF are the job reallocation in the US and the indicator of hiring
and ﬁring regulations corrected for the degree of enforcement, respectively. Micco and Pages (2007), using a
difference-in difference-approach, also estimated a similar effect; that is to say a cut by about one half of the
difference between the job ﬂows of the industries with high ﬂexibility requirements and those with low ﬂexibility
requirements by moving from a country with low to a country with high hiring and ﬁring regulations. Their country
sample and period of observation are different from ours.
28There is also ample evidence that regulations in product and labour market tend to be correlated across
countries (see, for example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005)).
29We have also used US employment-weighted ﬁrm turnover rather than US job ﬂows as the industrysize
interacting factor: the results are largely similar to those reported in the paper and are available on request. We ﬁnd
some sensitivity in the speciﬁcations that also interact with region but the robustness of the labour regulations holds
in this alternative.
21and signiﬁcant for Latin American countries.30
So far we have focused on the effects of labour regulations on overall job reallocation. It is also
interesting to shed some light on whether such regulations have a different impact on the
different margins of reallocation, namely on job ﬂows due to the entry and exit of ﬁrms in the
market and those due to reallocation among incumbents (see Table 6).31
Table 6: Job ﬂows by entering, exiting and continuing ﬁrms - the role of labour market regula-
tions (difference-in-difference analysis)
Entry and exit Continuers
(1) (2)
USA SUM (Entry and exit) -0.1100***
EPL (Adj) [0.0165]
USA SUM (Continuers) -0.0513**
EPL (Adj) [0.0252]
Country effects YES YES
Industrysize effects YES YES
Observations 920 934
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.78
All regressions are weighted by the total employment in each
country, industry and size cell and include an intercept. Ro-
bust standard errors in brackets. = signiﬁcant at 10%, = sig-
niﬁcant at 5%, = signiﬁcant at 1%. USA SUM (Entry and
exit): industrysize job reallocation due to entering and exit-
ing ﬁrms in the US. USA SUM (Continuers): industrysize
job reallocation due to continuing ﬁrms in the US. EPL (Adj)
is an indicator of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations ad-
justed to take into account different degrees of enforcement of
regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the results of estimating the job ﬂow regressions for entering and
exiting ﬁrms, controlling for labour market regulations corrected by the degree of enforcement.
Column (2) does the same for continuing ﬁrms. The results suggest a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant effect of labour market regulation (interacted with US job reallocation) on labour
mobility generated by both entering and exiting ﬁrms as well as continuing ﬁrms, although
30There are models that yield a positive relationship between business regulations impacting entry and exit and
job turnover. For example, Koeniger and Prat (2007) have a model with both intensive and extensive (that is,
through ﬁrm entry and exit) margins of adjustment, and ﬁxed and/or start-up costs imposed by product market
regulations. They ﬁnd that product market regulations lead to higher job turnover, as the competition for workers is
alleviated by the ﬁrm selection effect, the costs of adjusting the labour force decrease and thus ﬁrms have less
incentive to smooth out their labour demand schedule.
31We focus on the combined ﬂows due to entry and exit of ﬁrms because of the very high correlations between
entry and exit across industries in most countries. This in turn suggests that entries and exits are largely part of a
creative destruction process in which entry and exit reﬂect within industry reallocation reﬂecting idiosyncratic
differences across ﬁrms within industries (see Bartelsman et al. (2004) for evidence based on the same dataset used
in this paper, as well as Geroski (1991), Baldwin and Gorecki (1991)).
22labour market regulations have a stronger estimated effect on the labour mobility generated by
entry/exit than on that generated by continuers.32
Overall, these results conﬁrm the importance of labour market regulations in shaping labour
adjustment patterns, particularly so in those industries and size classes where technological and
market factors require more frequent employment changes. Controlling for other regulations
inﬂuencing ﬁrm behaviour does not signiﬁcantly alter the results. There is also evidence in our
data that labour market regulations are more important for entering and exiting ﬁrms than for
continuing ﬁrms.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
In the empirical analysis, we control for country and industrysize effects, as well as for
unobservable effects using a difference-in-difference approach. Moreover, we test the robustness
of results for hiring and ﬁring regulations by including other regulatory variables. In addition,
we test the sensitivity of our results by using excess job reallocation instead of gross job
reallocation, restricting our analysis to industrysize cells with more than ﬁve ﬁrms in a given
cell and to manufacturing industries only (not reported here but available on request). However,
the use of quasi panel data may still run the risk that results are affected by the inclusion of a
speciﬁc country or industry in the sample that drives the results in a given direction. The use of
an unbalanced panel on the industry dimension makes this risk potentially more serious.
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis: Estimated coefﬁcient on enforcement adjusted hiring and ﬁring
regulations interacted with US job reallocation and 95% conﬁdence intervals, exclud-
ing one country or one industry at a time, labour market regulations (Column (1) from
Table 4)
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database.
32In Table 6, we use the US job reallocation for entry and exit as the propensity for entering and exiting ﬁrms
and the US job reallocation for continuers as the propensity for reallocation for continuers. We have also
considered alternative speciﬁcations where for both propensities we use the overall job reallocation for the
industrysize class and obtain very similar results. We also estimate the job ﬂow regressions for entering and
exiting ﬁrms separately and ﬁnd that labour market regulations affect both entry and exit margins.
23To test for the robustness of results to changes in the sample, we re-estimate our preferred
speciﬁcation – column (1) in Table 4 – removing one country, or one industry, at a time from the
sample. The results in Figure 2 show a remarkable stability of the estimated coefﬁcient for the
interaction term to changes in the sample along the country or the industry dimension. The point
coefﬁcient estimates for the interaction term are always negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
The coefﬁcient is somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of France, Italy and Mexico among
countries and the trade and restaurant sector, with all leading to a slightly weaker (but still
statistically signiﬁcant) estimated effect of regulations.
245 Conclusion
This paper exploits a rich, new database with harmonised indicator data on job ﬂows across
industries and size classes for 16 industrial and emerging economies over the past decade. We
ﬁnd that all countries in our sample exhibit sizeable annual gross job ﬂows. Industry and
size-class effects together account for a very large share of the overall variability in job ﬂows
across country, industry and size class cells (over 50 percent). Interestingly, the most important
factor here is the employer size. Small businesses exhibit a substantially higher pace of job
creation and destruction and this pattern is pervasive across industries and countries. Industry
effects also play a signiﬁcant, albeit much smaller, role in shaping job ﬂows. Taken together, it
is clear that some form of technology, cost and demand factors that are common across
countries account for the bulk of the variation in job ﬂows. Nevertheless, even after controlling
for industry/technology and size factors, there remain signiﬁcant differences in job ﬂows across
countries that could reﬂect differences in business environment conditions.
Our harmonised indicators dataset allows us to look at two factors shaping the business
environment - regulations on the hiring and ﬁring of workers and product market regulations. To
minimise the possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-country
regressions, we use a difference-in-difference approach. The empirical results suggest that
stringent hiring and ﬁring regulations (and their consistent enforcement) reduce job turnover,
especially in industry and size-class cells that inherently exhibit more job turnover. To capture
the latter, we use the US patterns as a benchmark to identify and quantify industrysize class
cells with inherently higher job turnover. Labour regulations also appear to distort the patterns
of ﬂows across industry and size classes within a country. Stringent labour regulations mainly
affect the entry and exit of ﬁrms and their associated job creation and destruction. Controlling
for product market regulations does not alter these results signiﬁcantly.
Much work remains to be done to understand the implications of our ﬁndings. The results
provide evidence that stringent labour regulations have an impact on reallocation dynamics. It is
a much larger step to demonstrate that stringent labour regulations have an adverse impact on
the efﬁcient allocation of labour in a manner consistent with the predictions of Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). To explore the latter, we need to measure not only reallocation but also
productivity at the micro level. A number of studies have found that allocative efﬁciency is
important for understanding differences in the level and growth of productivity across time,
industries and countries (see, for example, Foster et al. (2001) and Bartelsman et al. (2009)).
Putting those ﬁndings together with those in this paper certainly suggests that stringent labour
market regulations may have an important adverse impact on allocative efﬁciency and in turn
productivity levels and growth. However, much work (including additional data infrastructure
development) is needed to bring all of the pieces together to explore these important issues.
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28Table A.1: Data sources used for ﬁrm demographics and job ﬂows
Max. industry coverage
Country Source Period (number of industries) Threshold
OECD
Finland Business register 1988-1998 All (17) Emp  1
Turnover:
France Fiscal database 1989-1997 All (17) Man: Euro 0.58m
Serv: Euro 0.17m
Germany (West) Social security 1977-1999 All but civil service, Emp  1
self employed (11)
Italy Social security 1986-1994 All (19) Emp  1
Portugal Employment-based 1983-1998 All but public Emp  1
register administration (19)
United Kingdom Business register 1980-1998 Manufacturing (10) Emp  1
US Business register 1988-1997 Private businesses (19) Emp  1
LAC
Argentina Register, based on Integrated 1995-2002 All (19) Emp  1
System of Pensions
Brazil Census 1996-2001 Manufacturing (13) Emp  1
Chile Annual Industry 1979-1999 Manufacturing (13) Emp  10
Survey (ENIA)
Colombia Annual Manufacturing 1982-1998 Manufacturing (13) Emp  10
Survey (EAM)
Mexico Social security 1985-2001 All (17) Emp  1
TRANSITION
Estonia Business register 1995-2001 All (19) Emp  1
Hungary Fiscal register (APEH) 1992-2001 All (19) Emp  1
Latvia Business register 1996-2002 All (18) Emp  1
Slovenia Business register 1992-2001 All (19) Emp  1
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9Table B.1: Average job ﬂows in the 1990s, overall and by region, total economy (unbalanced
panel)
OVERALL
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Job creation rate 1048 0.147 0.067 0.000 0.647
Job destruction rate 1048 0.131 0.062 0.000 0.419
Net employment growth 1048 0.015 0.065 -0.299 0.419
Job reallocation rate 1048 0.278 0.112 0.000 0.875
Excess job reallocation rate 1048 0.231 0.098 0.000 0.732
Job creation rate (entry) 1048 0.055 0.043 0.000 0.357
Job destruction rate (exit) 1048 0.046 0.029 0.000 0.216
OECD
Job creation rate 448 0.127 0.046 0.033 0.288
Job destruction rate 448 0.127 0.060 0.029 0.411
Net employment growth 448 0.000 0.046 -0.282 0.148
Job reallocation rate 448 0.254 0.096 0.072 0.57
Excess job reallocation rate 448 0.223 0.085 0.058 0.472
Job creation rate (entry) 448 0.045 0.030 0.003 0.195
Job destruction rate (exit) 448 0.045 0.028 0.000 0.216
LAC
Job creation rate 300 0.148 0.061 0.033 0.431
Job destruction rate 300 0.140 0.066 0.041 0.419
Net employment growth 300 0.008 0.053 -0.214 0.286
Job reallocation rate 300 0.288 0.114 0.086 0.785
Excess job reallocation rate 300 0.248 0.103 0.066 0.732
Job creation rate (entry) 300 0.056 0.040 0.000 0.227
Job destruction rate (exit) 300 0.053 0.032 0.003 0.152
TRANSITION
Job creation rate 300 0.174 0.088 0.000 0.647
Job destruction rate 300 0.128 0.061 0.000 0.385
Net employment growth 300 0.046 0.087 -0.299 0.419
Job reallocation rate 300 0.303 0.123 0.000 0.875
Excess job reallocation rate 300 0.227 0.109 0.000 0.608
Job creation rate (entry) 300 0.070 0.056 0.000 0.357
Job destruction rate (exit) 300 0.039 0.025 0.000 0.135
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised indicators database.
30Table C.1: Deﬁnitions of institutional variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Hiring and ﬁring regulations Flexibility in hiring and ﬁring (5B(ii)) from Fraser Institute,
hiring and ﬁring restrictions of companies are determined by
private contract (World Economic Forum: Global Competitive-
ness Report); scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Business regulations Regulation of business activities (5c) from Fraser Institute
(World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report);
scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Law and order Integrity of legal system (2e) from Fraser Institute, which is
based on Political Risk Component I (Law and Order) from the
International Country Risk Guide; scale [0,10], 10 being the
worst.
Table C.2: Institutional variables, 1990s
OVERALL
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hiring and ﬁring regulations 5.261 1.515 2.878 7.700
Law and order adj. hiring and ﬁring regulations 4.113 2.019 0.000 7.209
Business regulations 3.490 1.389 1.100 5.900
Law and order adj. business regulations 2.490 1.233 0.000 4.600
Law and order 2.280 2.818 0.000 10.000
EU & USA
Hiring and ﬁring regulations 5.427 1.804 2.878 7.400
Law and order adj. hiring and ﬁring regulations 5.084 1.559 2.878 6.600
Business regulations 3.074 1.682 1.100 5.600
Law and order adj. business regulations 2.822 1.349 0.000 4.600
Law and order 0.469 1.121 0.000 3.000
LAC
Hiring and ﬁring regulations 4.679 0.943 3.230 5.740
Law and order adj. hiring and ﬁring regulations 2.249 1.642 0.000 4.431
Business regulations 4.206 1.297 2.617 5.900
Law and order adj. business regulations 1.811 1.321 0.000 3.320
Law and order 5.230 3.175 2.280 10.000
TRANSITION
Hiring and ﬁring regulations 5.696 1.705 3.586 7.700
Law and order adj. hiring and ﬁring regulations 4.742 1.846 3.079 7.209
Business regulations 3.323 0.669 2.650 4.200
Law and order adj. business regulations 2.757 0.716 1.776 3.486
Law and order 1.763 1.119 0.637 3.300
Source: Own calculations based on harmonised ﬁrm-level database and Gwartney and Lawson
(2004).
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